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Abstract: Privatization is, since Hardin, often promoted as a solution to many 
natural resource management challenges, particularly in common-pool resource 
systems. However, novel forms of privatization are being implemented in unex-
amined ways. In this article we explore how privatization affects natural resource 
management from the perspective of multi-dimensional social-ecological sys-
tems. We critique the notion that privatization is desirable due to its pure effi-
ciency, and argue that efficiency must be relative to achieving other normative 
societal goals, in particular, sustainability. While sustainability outcomes often 
cannot be fully actualized, the processes through which privatization attempts to 
achieve them are more tangible criteria. First, we draw on (1) distributional and 
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(2) procedural justice as normative societal goals to assess effectiveness of differ-
ent forms of privatization. Second, we analyze the broader implications of privati-
zation for social-ecological system functioning considering (3) path dependency 
and (4) spillover effects. We apply these four concepts to examine three different 
cases of privatization: eco-certification in fisheries, seed patents in agriculture 
and property rights in rangelands. We argue that the evaluative criteria for the 
success of privatization are often oversimplified, and highlight how privatization 
can influence social-ecological systems and the achievement of normative goals 
in largely unexamined ways.
Keywords: Ecological economics, governance, institutional economics, political 
science, public policy, sustainability
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1. Introduction
Privatization is a favored solution to many common-pool resource (CPR) man-
agement challenges in social-ecological systems, especially in CPRs subject to 
open access property regimes. Here we define CPRs by the two core challenges 
they present for management; high rivalry regarding resource appropriation (i.e. 
subtractability; the benefits of appropriated resources are captured only by the 
appropriator) and low excludability (difficulty in excluding resource appropria-
tion). In the absence of effective governance (i.e. open-access), these two system 
characteristics often lead to the overconsumption of resources, conflict amongst 
resource users and the externalization of appropriation costs are not addressed 
through sufficient institutional arrangements (i.e. set of rules and norms for use) 
(Ostrom 1990; Poteete et al. 2010). Privatization is an effort to sidestep these 
challenges by altering the formal, and potentially informal, institutional arrange-
ments that govern CPR systems through incentivizing restricted groups or indi-
viduals to resolve the challenges by giving them varying degrees of exclusive 
rights (Demsetz 1967; Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Similarly for 
public goods (low rivalry and low excludability) such as clean air, investment 
costs and innovation fall to the individual if they are not provided by the group 
(e.g. government), but the benefits are shared across all resource users, leading 
to ‘free riding’, a lack of investment (e.g. lack of incentives) and slower gains in 
resource use efficiency that might be expected where both costs and benefits are 
internalized (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1984). 
Privatization (See Table 1 for a glossary of key terms) attempts to increase 
excludability in resource appropriation by instituting some form of property rights 
arrangements that shifts access rights exclusively to specific groups or individu-
als, and thereby aims to reduce, internalize or even monopolize, externalities (e.g. 
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investments, management costs, efficiency of use). In addition, privatization can 
alter the allocation of goods in a market to minimize rivalry. An example is individ-
ual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries, where the right to fish a certain amount 
may be sold or traded as a form of resource appropriation (Soliman 2014; Pinkerton 
and Davis 2015; McCormack 2017). In a classical view, privatization attempts to 
shift the costs and benefits to individuals, to avoid a dilemma between individual 
and group interests (e.g. externalities). It was long assumed that privatization solves 
the so-called tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) as the rational extraction rate 
for each individual in a commons is where marginal private benefits equal average 
costs and not the marginal costs. In contrast, a private owner acting rationally will 
extract up to the point where the marginal private benefits equal marginal costs, 
avoiding externalities and overconsumption. Common property, which has been 
extensively studied in CPR systems (Agrawal 2001), is essentially a form of privati-
zation at the group level. However, common property can be distinguished as a form 
of privatization because the potential for individuals or even the group to transfer or 
sell common property is usually not considered or impossible.
Privatization has proliferated as a policy for common-pool resource man-
agement worldwide, especially where open access conditions prevail. For 
example, many fisheries have privatized fishing grounds, spatial areas where 
specific individuals can exclusively fish. In the case of mobile fish species, 
percentages of the total fish catch for a given season are allocated (sold or 
licensed), as a form of property rights (Acheson 2006; Costello et al. 2008; 
Pinkerton and Davis 2015). Similarly, communally managed rangelands and 
other ‘common’ land, including forests are being brought under private prop-
erty regimes; where traditional commons or common property regimes are 
being transferred to private individuals or more exclusive groups (e.g. Ning 
and Richard 1999; Mwangi 2007; Guéneau and Tozzi 2008). Assumptions of 
open access, and the need for privatization, are that they lead to overexploita-
tion, driving much of the logic towards a need for enclosure. However, open 
access commons can be well managed and necessary in some cases such as 
with pastoralists (Moritz et al. 2013).
The appeal of privatization as a simple policy solution that fits the market-
based policy mindset of the late 20th and 21st centuries has catalyzed its appli-
cation in natural resource management (Polani 1944). Yet despite its obvious 
simplicity, privatization is a broad and, often, overgeneralized approach to the 
governance of complex social-ecological systems. The term privatization encom-
passes a broad suite of approaches that attempt to assign some degree of prop-
erty rights to solve the rivalry and/or excludability challenges in CPRs subject 
to open access. However, the manifestations of privatization are evolving in new 
and largely unexamined ways (Foley and McCay 2014). This includes control 
over the distribution of resources in the market such as eco-labelling in fisheries 
or forestry (Pattberg 2005; Foley and McCay 2014), or control of information, 
technology or decision-making processes related to resource governance and the 
institutions they create, affect or operate within. 
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We examine how different forms of privatization interact with broader (social-
ecological) system properties. We attempt to broaden the scope under which priva-
tization can be evaluated as an appropriate institutional intervention to achieve 
societal goals. We begin by outlining a conceptual framework for evaluating 
privatization that focuses on notions of justice (distributive and procedural) and 
system dynamics (path dependency and spillover effects). We apply this frame-
work to three diverse case studies where newly emerging forms of privatization 
are used as governance interventions. In the discussion we synthesize our analysis 
into key points for recognizing new diverse forms of privatization in SES, and 
how broadening the evaluative criteria for privatization can enhance these new 
governance approaches to match societal goals towards sustainability. 
1.1. A sustainability lens for evaluating privatization
We interpret privatization as the transfer of the control over social processes related 
to the governance, use or distribution of resources from either open access or com-
mon property to private organizations, selected groups, or individual(s). Common 
property can be considered a form of group privatization (exclusive group rights), 
but typically does not permit individual or group transferability via market mech-
anisms as is typically associated with other forms of privatization (see Table 1). 
Privatization can often occur through assigning property, access or use rights to 
either some aspect of those social processes or to the direct appropriation of the 
resource(s). For example, traditional forms of privatization include controlling 
access to the physical space where resources are located, which can be done through 
a broad spectrum of property rights arrangements (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
The rationale for privatization is typically based on an economic principle 
that scarce resources need to be efficiently allocated, and that private control is 
inherently more efficient than public control (e.g. Sheshinski and López-Calva 
2003). However, efficiency as a normative goal (i.e. the goals of non-wastefulness 
or maximum output per unit input) only provides an instrumental means towards 
other societal goals related to the use of resources. Thus, efficiency  must always 
be assessed in relation to the desired societal outcomes to which it is oriented 
(Baumgärtner et al. 2012). Such intrinsic societal goals can vary widely, from 
increased human well-being, the conservation of biological diversity, or economic 
growth. As such, the effectiveness of privatization (or any other alternative gover-
nance regime) must be conceptualized more broadly than more ‘efficient’ resource 
use. Such assessments must consider how any increases in efficiency help achieve 
some other clearly defined normative goal(s). Here we focus on the normative 
goals of sustainability comprising: (1) distributive justice, defined here as socially 
just allocation of resources within and across generations (Lélé 1991; Langhelle 
2000; Loos et al. 2014), and (2) procedural justice defined here as participatory 
governance by and empowerment of individuals, communities, and societies to 
decide how their needs are met (Agyeman and Evans 2004; McDermott 2013; 
Loos et al. 2014). Certainly these are not the only criteria or normative goals 
related to sustainability, but they provide broad evaluative criteria.
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In addition, we consider the broader social and environmental processes 
impacted by privatization. Here, drawing on literature on social-ecological sys-
tems (SES) (Folke et al. 2005; Liu et al. 2007; Ostrom 2009; Partelow 2018) and 
system dynamics, we focus on how different forms of privatization may influ-
ence path dependency and spillover effects. These two, largely unintended, con-
sequences of privatization may have profound effects on sustainable outcomes 
beyond the spatial or temporal scope of the intended privatization intervention 
and therefore should be considered alongside the issues of distributional and par-
ticipatory justice when considering the suitability of privatization as a solution 
governing CPR problems in SES.
Path dependency is defined as the limitations or dependency of future sys-
tem states or changes on past system states and functioning (i.e. institutional, 
economic, technological) (Arthur 1989; North 1990; Mahoney 2000). Path 
Table 1: Definition of key terms.
Common-pool resource – a type of resource with high rivalry in consumption (i.e. subtractability of 
resources) and challenges for excludability; i.e. the ability to exclude other users from consuming the 
resource.
Open access – absence of governance rules for non-excludable resources (e.g. CPRs), where no form of 
property rights for access or withdrawal exist for a specific individual or group.
Privatization – the transfer of control in natural resource management from the public domain to a 
restricted entity, group or individual, and where the mechanisms for control of the use of the resource are 
based on market relations.
Common-property – Exclusive collective access, use and/or management rights to a defined resource or 
set of resources at the group level (typically inclusive of a whole community). Common property rights 
may be formally (e.g. legally from the state) or informally (e.g. through historical norms) established, 
defined and enforced. In practice, customary common property rights may be highly contingent and 
subject to constant negotiation and context-specific interpretation. Common property, in theory, can be 
viewed as a move on the spectrum towards privatization as a first step of enclosure. However, scholarship 
on common property has historically not considered it as a form of privatization because it is typically not 
transferable. 
Social-ecological system – Concept that interdependencies exist between social and ecological functions 
and outcomes (Liu et al. 2007; Ostrom 2009; Fischer et al. 2015a).
Path dependence/lock-in – the limitations or dependency of future system states or changes on past 
system states and functioning. Once a track/path is started, the costs of reversal are very high and come 
with increasing returns, in that the probability of further steps along the same path increase with each 
move down that path (Pierson 2000).
Spillover/flows – externalities as direct or indirect effects outside the bounds of the intended resource 
management system or component being privatized.
Procedural justice – the participatory governance by and empowerment of individuals, communities, and 
societies to decide how their needs are met (Agyeman and Evans 2004; Loos et al. 2014).
Distributional justice – ensuring a socially just or fair allocation of resources within and between 
different generations (Lélé 1991; Langhelle 2000; Loos et al. 2014).
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dependency is not necessarily problematic with regards to achieving sustainabil-
ity outcomes in CPR management; however, established institutional changes 
make it difficult to revert back to pre-existing institutional arrangements and 
may limit unforeseen future options or compromise adaptability. Privatization 
can create path dependencies, as may all institutional arrangements, and it is 
critical to examine those which are intentional as well as those which may be 
unaccounted for, indirect or undesired in relation to desired normative goals due 
to the nature of social-ecological systems. Spillover is interpreted as the effects 
or externalities incurred on system processes from interactions with or to other 
systems (Liu et al. 2015). Privatization typically aims to influence one particular 
property rights institution, but this may cause spillover effects resulting from the 
multidimensional character of SES, which the institution is embedded within 
(Schlüter et al. 2019).
We are aware that many criteria might be used to evaluate privatization; we 
have chosen spillovers, path dependency, procedural and distributive justice for 
the following reasons. Spillovers and path dependencies provide criteria for eval-
uation which exemplify the (context dependent) dynamic, spatial and temporal 
dimensions of SES where privatization may trigger changes. Dimensions of jus-
tice provide alternative evaluative criteria to the neoclassical focus on efficient 
resource allocation. Justice focuses on socially desired outcomes such as distri-
butional justice, ensuring a socially just or fair allocation of resources within and 
between different generations (Lélé 1991; Langhelle 2000; Loos et al. 2014), as 
well as procedural justice, the participatory governance by and empowerment 
of individuals, communities, and societies to decide how their needs are met 
(Agyeman and Evans 2004; Loos et al. 2014). Through application of this concep-
tual framework to the case studies below, we argue that broadening the evaluative 
scope under which we assess privatization brings new insights to it as a suitable 
form of governance to achieve societal goals while managing CPR problems. 
2. Case studies
Here we use our framework to analyze three cases: (1) Property rights in Mongolian 
rangelands, (2) Market-based governance and eco-certification in fisheries, and 
(3) Seed patents and privatized agriculture systems. Each case represents a dif-
ferent type of privatization in a different SES. The diversity of the three case 
studies is intended to reflect the diversity of the common-pool resource ‘systems’, 
and different types of privatization, that are applied as solutions to common-pool 
resource problems. In this sense, the following cases aim to portray context and 
conceptual diversity, rather than focus on a more systematic comparative analysis.
As we will examine, privatization is no longer limited to granting private 
property or access rights to specific resource users in previously commonly man-
aged land (case study 1). Now we restrict access rights to particular characteristics 
by which goods extracted from common-pool resources can be marketed as a 
form of privatized natural resource governance (case study 2). The benefits that 
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can be accrued from using information previous considered a commonly held 
resource is also increasingly privatized (case study 3).
The three case studies differ considerably in terms of system boundaries and 
the nature of the resources being exploited (from discrete physical spaces to spa-
tially unbound information flows) and from specific interventions (cases 1 and 2) 
to more general societal trends (case study 3). This means making comparisons 
across cases problematic. We address this by focusing on one or more normative 
aspects (distributional or procedural justice) and one or more SES dynamic (path 
dependence or spillover) that arises with the form of privatization in the context of 
the particular case (see Table 2). Our intention is not to provide a complete typol-
ogy of privatization interventions across differing SESs, although further work 
to do this would surely help situate the discourse. Instead, we seek to illustrate 
the importance of SES context, justice and system dynamics when considering if 
privatization represents a suitable intervention for sustainable CPR management.
2.1. Property rights in Mongolian rangelands
Rangelands cover roughly 80% of Mongolia’s land area, support 73 million 
head of livestock (102 million sheep equivalents) and 153,000 herder house-
holds as of 2016, and provide livelihoods, directly or indirectly, to about a third 
of Mongolia’s human population. In this low-input system, herders graze their 
livestock on natural vegetation year-round, moving among four seasonal pasture 
areas, and making occasional long-distance moves to fatten animals or escape 
drought or harsh winters. Mongolia’s rangelands are common-pool resources 
where exclusion of potential users is difficult and grazing by one individual’s 
animals leaves less forage for others. In the 20th century, Mongolia’s range-
lands witnessed several major changes in governance. A quasi-feudal system 
characterized the early 20th century, where nobles controlled defined territories, 
allocated pastures within these territories to groups of herders, and regulated 
large-scale seasonal movements and grazing reserves, and livestock were owned 
both by nobles and their subjects. Smaller-scale movements and allocation of 
pasture within seasonal pasture areas were informally governed by herders in 
a local area (Fernández-Giménez 1999). Patron-client  relationships between 
Table 2: Overview of analytical sustainability lens on privatization and case studies examined.










Rangelands  Mongolia   X  X  X
Fisheries  Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC)
 X  X  X  
Agriculture  Seed patents in 
agriculture
 X   X  
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wealthy herders and poorer relatives or  neighbors were common (Humphrey 
and Sneath 1999). After the 1921 Revolution and a prolonged period of transi-
tion marked by several failed attempts at collectivization, a socialist system of 
herding collectives (negdel) was fully established by 1960. Under the collective 
system, herders tended state-owned livestock for a salary and were allowed 
to own a limited number of animals for personal consumption. Rangelands 
became state property and pasture management, including herd movements 
and grazing reserves, was regulated by the negdel, which also provided vet-
erinary services, emergency fodder, and assistance with seasonal movements 
(Fernández-Giménez 1999).
Following Mongolia’s democratic transition in 1990 and the opening of mar-
kets, a second major transition in rangeland governance and livestock owner-
ship took place. The collectives were abruptly dismantled, leaving an institutional 
void with respect to rangeland governance (e.g. setting stocking rates, regulating 
seasonal herd movements and protecting emergency forage reserves). Collective 
assets were privatized, including buildings, machinery and livestock. Collective 
members were entitled to a share of the collective’s livestock and many non-
members used their privatization vouchers to purchase livestock. As Mongolians 
in cities and towns lost government jobs, they returned to the countryside to 
claim or purchase livestock and try to make a living as herders, leading to an 
initial increase in the number of herder households after privatization (Fernández-
Giménez 2001, 2002). 
Following livestock privatization, the national herd size grew rapidly. 
Rangelands remained state property, to be used in common by the herders in 
each county. Privatization of pastures is unconstitutional in Mongolia; however, 
several laws were passed in an attempt to strengthen the legal framework govern-
ing rangelands and to clarify the responsibility and authority of local government 
to regulate herd numbers and movements (Fernández-Giménez and Batbuyan 
2004; Upton 2009). The 2002 update of the Law on Land provides for long-
term leases of nomadic winter and spring campsites, and use contracts for winter 
and spring pasture. However, most local officials were initially unaware of the 
laws, and to date many lack the capacity, resources or political will to enforce 
them (Fernández-Giménez and Batbuyan 2004). Further, wealthy and socially 
powerful herders were privileged in the process of gaining formal possession 
of campsites, leaving poor and marginalized individuals, including many single 
women, to seek access through their relationships with wealthier or more power-
ful male relatives or patrons (Murphy 2014a). Weak institutions for pastureland 
governance coupled with the growing number of livestock contributed to declin-
ing herd mobility, increased year-round grazing of key resources, increased 
competition and conflict over pasture and water, and growing concerns about 
pasture degradation and herder vulnerability (Mearns 1996). A growing wealth 
gap was observed between relatively few very successful herders, and a much 
larger number of poor herders with marginal herd sizes (Griffin 2003; Nixson 
and Walters 2006; Murphy 2014b).
Privatizing the commons 755
A series of dry summers and extremely harsh winters in 1999–2002 killed 30% 
of the national herd and left thousands destitute (Fernández-Giménez et al. 2012). 
This disaster served as a “wake up call” for international donors and NGOs, who, 
seeing little progress in government regulation began to invest in formal commu-
nity-based rangeland management organizations, providing technical assistance and 
training to herders to organize into groups to self-manage their pastures, with the 
aim to improve rangeland conditions and livelihoods simultaneously. By 2006, over 
2000 such groups had formed across Mongolia (Mau and Chantsalkham 2006). 
While CBRM groups have demonstrated positive social outcomes (Ulambayar 
et al. 2016), they also create new mechanisms for excluding some households from 
access to pastures (Upton 2009; Murphy 2014a). A second drought-winter disaster 
in 2009–2010 again led to massive livestock mortality, affected 28% of Mongolia’s 
human population and left 44,000 herder households with no animals (Fernández-
Giménez et al. 2012). The number of herders declined by 30% between 2000 and 
2014 (Fernández-Giménez et al. 2017). However, the number of animals rebounded 
and continued to grow, reaching 102 million sheep unit equivalents in 2016, the 
highest number in recorded history (Mongolian National Statistical Office). 
As of 2018, the Mongolian Parliament continues to debate proposed pas-
tureland legislation, with advocates arguing that providing herder groups with 
exclusive rights to defined winter and spring pasture areas is essential to incen-
tivize sustainable grazing behavior, such as enforcing stocking rates in line with 
rangeland carrying capacity (Enkh-Amgalan 2009; Hannam 2014). Others argue 
against tenure formalization for rangelands, pointing out that secure rights for 
some will limit the flexibility of others, and that flexibility and mobility are the 
hallmarks of sustainability in low-productivity, high-variability rangeland sys-
tems such as Mongolia (Kamimura 2013). This tension between the need for 
secure rights to pastures and flexible access in emergencies, dubbed the “para-
dox of pastoral land tenure” (Fernández-Giménez 2002), played out in the 2009–
2010 winter disaster where formal community-based groups with healthy pasture 
reserves became targets for herders from other districts moving to escape disaster 
(Fernández-Giménez et al. 2012). The strong cultural norm of reciprocity that 
underlies pasture sharing with neighbors is essential for survival even as it also 
increases vulnerability for some herders. Careful ethnographic accounts of cross-
boundary negotiations for reciprocal pasture use point to the inequities in who is 
able to gain access to pastures in other districts during disasters, based on social 
networks and political ties (Murphy 2011). 
With regard to livestock ownership, while the national herd size continues to 
climb, herders are leaving the countryside for the city. Large herds are concen-
trated in the hands of a few wealthy herd owners, who increasingly rely on contract 
labor to herd their animals (Murphy 2015). The dynamics of these arrangements 
vary. In some cases, they allow poor herders to build their own herds to a viable 
size, especially when the contract allows them to keep a certain percentage of the 
young females of the year. In others, they result in a more exploitive relationship 
that traps herders in poverty.
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The combined effects of livestock privatization, incremental quasi- 
privatization of pastoral resources such as nomadic campsites, and weak gov-
ernance of Mongolia’s state-owned rangelands triggered distinct inequities in 
livestock ownership and access to pastoral resources, as well as spillover effects 
and path dependence. Two types of path dependence are visible. First is the pov-
erty trap poor herders find themselves in when they lack a viable herd size and 
typically must consume too many productive animals to allow their herd to grow. 
Contract herding can sometimes allow herders a path out of poverty but patron-
client relationships based on exchange of herding labor often trap poor herders 
in a servile relationship to more wealthy and powerful households. A second and 
related trap is the lack of access to campsites, good pastures and the transporta-
tion to reach them, which leads herders with small herds to camp continually in 
one place, degrading pastures and further limiting options for herd growth, wealth 
accumulation, access to transportation and better pastures. Both of these traps 
stem in part from failures of distributional justice. The most notable spillover 
effect is the pattern of unregulated, or more accurately, unfairly and inconsistently 
regulated cross-boundary movement of herds, which also leads to more intense 
ecological degradation. While this movement is in accordance with cultural tradi-
tion of reciprocal pasture use during disasters, it increases vulnerability of the host 
community and undermines efforts to strengthen community-based rangeland 
management institutions. According to accounts by Murphy (2011), the ability to 
negotiate cross-boundary access is highly dependent on political connections and 
local power dynamics.
2.2. Market-based governance and eco-certification in fisheries
Fisheries are severely challenged with rivalry and excludability dilemmas (Pauly 
and Zeller 2016), and the social-ecological conditions between fisheries vary 
extensively across the world. Fisheries can range from low income subsistence-
based, targeting local low value non-migratory species, to industrial-scale vessels 
chasing highly valued mobile species for many months or years without going to 
port (Jacquet et al. 2010; FAO 2016). Finding reliably effective governance solu-
tions for fisheries with diverse conditions has been, and continues to be, a consid-
erable challenge (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Basurto and Nenadovic 2012). 
Privatization of appropriation rights, has been used extensively in fisheries policy 
in the forms of individually transferable quotas (Bromley 2016; McCormack 
2017), often filling the governance gaps as a simple panacea approach to address 
resource management problems for fisheries.
Conceptually, eco-certifications are neither privatizing the resources (e.g. the 
fish) nor the appropriation right, but the governance of fisheries itself, or at least 
certain influential aspects (Foley and McCay 2014). This might be either moti-
vated by a failure of the state or group of states to govern the resource in a sustain-
able way (e.g. the NGO motivation) or by the desire to earn an extra premium in 
a competitive market (e.g. the private sector motivation). Eco-labels have created 
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a new consumer market for sustainable seafood as well as standards for how to 
define and evaluate the sustainability of fisheries. The ability to gain certification 
and to sell certified products is typically managed by a private organization.
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was founded as an organizational 
partnership between Unilever and World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which is the larg-
est private eco-certifier for seafood worldwide (www.msc.org). MSC nearly has 
a monopoly on eco-certified fish products, with over 300 wild-caught fisheries 
engaged, MSC controls access to the eco-labelled market for over 10% of all fish 
caught globally, which is worth an estimated $4.8 billion USD annually (Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) 2014). For a fishery to gain access to the MSC mar-
ket, compliance with governance standards is necessary and fees for certification 
need to be paid. All fishery evaluations for MSC are conducted by third-party 
organizations. The certification process can take up to 5 years and costs range 
between $20,000 and $300,000 USD annually per fishery (Goyert et al. 2010; 
www.msc.org).
The concept of MSC can be described as non-state market-based governance, 
where success is driven by the voluntary participation and evaluation of the stake-
holders involved, including fishers, seafood suppliers, consumers, the scientific 
community and environmental advocacy groups (Hadjimichael and Hegland 
2016). Despite the idea that a fishery which is operating sustainably should be 
willing to apply for certification, clear economic, institutional and motivational 
barriers exist in the ability or willingness to participate in certification. These 
barriers restrict who can decide the costs and benefits of ‘sustainable’ fisheries 
governance to specific groups of stakeholders who can and do participate in cer-
tification. Nonetheless, it is assumed that market incentives (either through price 
premiums or access to large buyers or retailers) are an efficient solution for moti-
vating such fishery participation.
Thus, the MSC model is based on the idea that private market-based incentives 
to participate in certification schemes are a viable mechanism to promote more 
sustainable fisheries governance. Despite limited participation, this MSC model 
now influences the global fisheries market for both participating, and importantly, 
non-participating fisheries. Many issues of justice remain regarding the distribu-
tion of costs and benefits from the certification market, in which only a few can 
participate, but many are affected by.
Can market-based governance with MSC provide sustainable governance 
solutions? Considerations are needed for dimensions of justice, such as who and 
what is being governed through MSC. An evident distinction can be observed 
in the disparity between large and small-scale fisheries. The process of MSC 
certification requires existing institutional capacity such as financial resources, 
knowledge and familiarity with administrative and bureaucratic processes, exist-
ing connections to markets with demand for labelled products as well as exist-
ing institutions for communication, trust and transparency within the fishery and 
between the involved certifying organizations. Before a MSC certificate is handed 
out, a third party must assess whether the fishery qualifies as sustainable under 
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their guidelines. These conditions are barriers to entry for most small-scale fisher-
ies, which account for ~90% of the livelihoods in the capture fishing sector and 
~50% of the total fish catch worldwide (Kittinger et al. 2013; FAO 2016). As a 
result, the majority of fisheries cannot participate in the process of sustainable 
fisheries governance under the MSC model, despite substantial spatial overlap 
in where many potentially certified industrial fisheries and small-scale fisheries 
operate as well as competition in market access between them. Access to benefits 
is restricted to participating large-scale fisheries, and thus the incentives to main-
tain ‘sustainable’ MSC fishing practices.
However, in contrast, certification can be viewed as a mechanism to increase 
livelihood security for fishers and stakeholders who can and do participate. But 
who participates? There are preconditions for being considered a sustainable fish-
ery, which small-scale fisheries have little or no access to despite often equal or 
less harmful fishing practices and often greater needs for governance solutions 
that can enable sustainable social welfare (Ponte 2012; Bush et al. 2013). The 
question then becomes, who benefits from market-based governance in fisher-
ies (Mace 2014)? The distribution of benefits and the assurance of a sustainably 
sourced food supply and livelihood are primarily European and North American 
large commercial fisheries. These fisheries sell to populations who are not depen-
dent on food from that fishery for survival, but who have the purchasing power 
to influence the success of eco-certification schemes through individual choices. 
Buying sustainable seafood, and supporting the sustainable governance of fisher-
ies through purchasing power, can become a privileged endeavor.
Following the idea of purchasing power as a mechanism for supporting sus-
tainable fisheries governance, questions remain regarding who decides the suit-
ability and direction of MSC. Market-based governance institutions leave the task 
of defining and ‘voting’ for sustainability to the economic market. Decisions on 
the evaluative criteria for governance are restricted to a specific group, rather 
than including the wide variety of stakeholders who will be affected on the global 
market for fish, both directly (e.g. fishers; seafood consumers) and indirectly (e.g. 
other marine users such as SCUBA divers; non-seafood consumers). However, 
one of the main reasons why certification schemes emerged is that governments 
around the world have often failed to provide solutions to meet marine and fish-
eries sustainability goals (Meidinger 2002). This nonetheless grants substantial 
power to those who have dominant influence in and knowledge about how eco-
nomic markets function and who can participate in them. This restricts whose nor-
mative goals are achieved and the motivations for achieving them (i.e. those who 
can and do purchase or consume seafood products). This is particularly visible in 
the case of MSC, the dominant certification scheme for fisheries (Ponte 2012). 
This leaves few other options for consumers who want to use their purchasing 
power as a ‘vote’ for governance, or for non-consumers to influence fisheries gov-
ernance in other ways (i.e. to support sustainable fisheries governance you have to 
buy fish products; you can’t vote without buying). Such a market-driven ideology 
creates concerns regarding procedural justice for those who are less powerful in 
Privatizing the commons 759
making financial decisions that reflect their governance ideology (i.e. having the 
financial means to pay more for sustainable seafood) or are simply not integrated 
into a globalized market-based worldview.
The means through which privatized fisheries governance can achieve just 
and equitable policies for the sector, through a globalized market-based economic 
framework, remain to be seen. This is particularly problematic when the same 
globalized market-based framework has created rapid exploitation of many fish-
eries worldwide (Eriksson et al. 2015) and created many gilded social-ecological 
traps of rapid resource exploitation (Steneck et al. 2011; Kittinger et al. 2013). 
Utilizing existing system structures to find sustainable governance solutions, 
instead of attempting to change those underlying structures which led to the chal-
lenges, could be referred to as a ‘weak’ sustainability approach (Ziegler and Ott 
2011; Holden et al. 2014; Stumpf et al. 2015). Global purchasing markets are used 
to actualize normative sustainability values into governance, arguably the same 
markets which have driven nearly catastrophic fisheries decline around the world 
through globalization (Berkes et al. 2006; Pauly and Zeller 2016). Even if the 
aim of MSC is to fill the governance gaps in the absence of the state or industry 
self-organization, relying on market-based governance hedges the potential for 
sustainability in the fisheries sector on consumer purchasing power, and voting 
through buying, where issues of justice become evident concerns for who decides 
and who benefits.
Two points can be discussed about how market-based certification schemes 
can create institutional path dependencies in fisheries governance. First, they 
are influenced by oligopolistic actors, in the food market (i.e. Unilever) or NGO 
“market” (i.e. WWF). Once governance becomes influenced by a few private 
organizations, they have a vested interest to keep their niche alive. It is their busi-
ness, and they do not have an interest in handing over governance of the fishery 
sector back to the state. Second, it is the consumer with high purchasing power 
who drives the positive feedback that reinforces these institutions. The social and 
cultural drivers of what is considered a sustainable consumer choice, given the 
options a consumer has, can become institutionalized on a spectrum from per-
sonal consumer purchasing strategies (how to choose), to personal or social norms 
(what choice is expected), to formal rules for the large scale purchasing of food 
(Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). Consumers can ideally determine, or rather rein-
force, what is classified as sustainable by their consumption choices. However, 
consumption choices are often guided by labeling, which lacks transparency 
regarding the criteria of sustainability for consumer choice. It is rare that informa-
tion is directly provided to consumers regarding ecological, economic or social 
dimensions. For example, MSC focuses substantially on ecological sustainability 
but does not consider the social conditions on the fishing vessels or in the pro-
cessing industry as extensively, e.g. (Stringer et al. 2016). It could be argued that 
most consumers are reliant on the certifying organization to provide the rigorous 
knowledge to support the claims of certification. In most cases consumers trust 
that the certifying organization is following rigorous sustainability criteria, both 
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social and ecological. Secondly, it is those consumers who are empowered who 
have the opportunity to choose, leaving it to those who have access to or who can 
afford purchasing eco-certified seafood to dictate what is sustainable through con-
sumption choices. In addition, market mechanisms assume that current paradigms 
of purchasing power and patterns of seafood consumption will continue to be a 
foundational aspect of sustainable fisheries governance in the sector’s future. For 
example, those who choose not to purchase seafood due to the challenges facing 
its sustainability are not directly influencing market mechanisms for governance.
Eco-certifications can institutionalize and create path dependencies, often set-
ting the conditions for reinforcing the behavior of consumer choices, and thus the 
effects that those choices have on the market and the fishery. Path dependency in 
consumer choice can also make new approaches to governance difficult to imple-
ment, particularly if a certifier dominates the market. For example, purchasing an 
eco-certified product is also a choice not to purchase or support a non-certified 
product, which may be a fishery regulated by a local small-scale fisher who can-
not afford certification but catches fish in local waters only, uses non-industrial 
gears and/or is more livelihood dependent on selling the catch. Who is better to 
support on the market in terms of sustainability? This will differ widely between 
context, but the purchasing norms of supporting what is certified as ‘sustainable’ 
creates dependencies on consumer expectations and purchasing norms. The link 
between how institutional path dependencies affect consumer choices may have 
distributive social-ecological effects on other fisheries which do not, cannot or 
will not participate in a globalized market-based governance approach, creating 
the need for further inquiry on whether privatizing governance can pave the way 
for distributional or procedural justice in order to achieve normative goals in the 
fisheries sector.
2.3. Seed patents and privatized agriculture systems
Farmers are not completely dependent on private goods for production. Of course, 
many farm inputs are sourced from private actors (e.g. fertilizers, biocides, 
machinery) but a vital input of production – seeds – have been saved by farm-
ers historically (e.g. seed exchange networks (Delêtre et al. 2011; Pautasso et al. 
2013)). For millennia a vital input, crop varieties, which determine very much the 
success of the farmer, have been in the public domain. Once more productive vari-
eties were developed, they could be easily reproduced by any farmer, saving seed 
grown from the previous year. Farmers could therefore exercise a large degree 
of control over their production systems and livelihoods without depending on 
private goods, providing they had access to land. The excludability problem has, 
until now, limited the ability of private actors, who have created seed innovations, 
to control and extract profits from such an improvement (Kloppenburg 1988; 
Mascarenhas and Busch 2006).
Three major factors have coalesced, over the last three decades, to facilitate 
increasing levels of privatization in agricultural systems and the ability of private 
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actors to exclude others from access to the resources, other than land, needed for 
production. Here we focus almost exclusively on ‘western’ agricultural produc-
tion systems typical of Europe, North America, Australia, and increasingly in the 
South American countries of Brazil and Argentina.
First, private actors have used genetic and ‘traditional’ breeding technology to 
produce agricultural plant varieties from publically owned natural capital – natu-
rally occurring germplasm and plant varieties selected by farmers over millennia 
(Brown and Darrah 1985). In particular, the genetically modified varieties, pro-
tected by patent law, have been very successful at replacing plant varieties bred 
from traditional selection methods and have increased farmer’s dependence on 
private seeds. Before genetically modified varieties were available, many farm-
ers used plant varieties bred from government programs, saved seeds for future 
sowing, and exchanged seeds with other farmers. For example, since the 1950s 
the percentage of US soybean farmers saving seed has declined from 60% to 
less than 5%. The rate of decline doubled after the introduction of genetically 
modified, patent protected, soya varieties (UDSA 2017). Farmers in the United 
States of America, Brazil and Argentina have been strong adopters of patented 
and protected plant varieties, mostly maize and soya. Maize and soya are the 
most economically successful varieties of genetically modified crops. Monsanto’s 
RoundUp Ready soybean varieties now constitute more than 90% of the total 
soybean plantings in the USA (UDSA 2017). A similar situation exists for maize, 
used as a source of animal feed, biofuel, and other industrial applications.
It is important to make the distinction between protected varieties and pat-
ented varieties of agricultural plants because their distinction under law dictates 
how farmers can acquire and use the seeds and products of the farm production. 
In the USA, it is illegal for anyone to sell seeds of protected plant varieties (Plant 
Variety Protection Act 1970 (USDA 1973)) i.e. plant varieties developed through 
sexual reproduction and selection, over the amount that would be required to sow 
the seller’s own fields (see Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer (US Court of Appeals 
1994)). Farmers using these types of varieties can therefore still engage in seed 
saving, in a limited capacity, and not rely completely on purchasing new seeds 
each year. Patent protected varieties, on the other hand, often do not allow farm-
ers to save seed (Howard 2009; Ikuta 2009). Plant patents in the USA explicitly 
deny farmers the right to save seed because it constitutes a breach of the patent 
act that prohibits replication of patented technology. While this form of privatiza-
tion is intended to increase investment in the development of new crop varieties, 
e.g. (Brush 2003), it can have unintended consequences for dimensions of justice.
Agricultural plant varieties developed by private actors have been recognized 
as private property by plant protection and patent laws, further entrenching the 
privatization of agriculture systems. All parties of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) are required to provide legal protection, in some form, to entities that 
develop commercial varieties of plants. However, the form and extent of protec-
tion provided by a country’s law is not explicitly defined in the WTO trade agree-
ments. Therefore, the nature and level of legal protection granted by a party’s 
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legal system can be highly variable. For example, differences can be seen between 
the laws of India and the USA, taking quite different approaches to plant protec-
tion laws. India responded to WTO requirements by developing unique legislation 
compared to the rest of the world and lies in stark contrast to the laws developed 
by the USA. Indian law recognizes the centuries-old contribution of farmers and 
other entities to the production and maintenance of agricultural biodiversity, and 
their inherent legal right to continue using those resources, and where appropriate, 
to gain financially from private development of plant varieties for profit. Indian 
law even allows farmers to use and sell seeds of ‘protected’ varieties – i.e. the 
product from their previous crops – as long as they are not branded as such dur-
ing sale e.g. (Kochupillai 2011). In contrast, laws in the USA provide strict patent 
protection – in the case of genetically modified organisms – and protection for 
entities that develop plant varieties bred using ‘traditional’ strategies (i.e. non-
recombinant DNA technologies). Plant variety and patent holders are vigorous 
defenders of their rights under US law. One notable case concerns Monsanto’s liti-
gation against Vernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer from Indiana, USA. Bowman was 
sued by Monsanto for planting soybean seeds he purchased from a grain elevator, 
seeds from surplus harvest that were sold to other farmers under Monsanto’s user 
agreement. The Court found that Bowman had infringed on Monsanto’s patent 
because he had violated a provision of the law relating to the replication of pat-
ented products. Because the plant had produced seeds this constituted replication 
of the patented product and a violation of both the terms of authorized sale and the 
patent. This contrasts with other types of patents that allow the sale of products 
containing patents but prohibit the manufacturing – replication – of that product’s 
patented components.
In addition to the changing relations between farmers and the owner of the 
genetic information of the varieties those farmers grow, this novel form of knowl-
edge privatization feeds into a form of path dependency known as the ‘technology 
treadmill’. The technological treadmill refers to farmer’s adoption of technology 
to increase farm yields (Cochrane 1979). Mechanization is one example of the 
technology treadmill. Adopting a particular technology usually involves a farmer 
taking on debt in order to increase yields and generate a profit from increased 
production, and reduced costs associated with the efficiency gains from technol-
ogy adoption. This system dynamic leads to the continual search for efficiency 
gains to offset depressed prices resulting from increasing supply due to previous 
increases in efficiency. As farmers pursue greater efficiencies to offset productiv-
ity gains and lower real prices from increased yields, they need to adopt further 
technology produced by private actors (Abson 2019). The technology treadmill 
quickly becomes a strong positive feedback loop which is difficult to escape given 
the typical high capital requirements and levels of debt held by farming house-
holds using these systems of production e.g. (Stone and Flachs 2017). 
Technologies, other than GM plant varieties, reinforce the treadmill (tech-
nology and knowledge dependence) of agricultural production held by private 
actors. In addition to privatizing plant varieties, private actors are also allowed to 
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patent the equipment that is essential for the optimum production of the protected 
plant variety. In order to gain maximum economic benefit from the plant variety, 
farmers must also purchase equipment and materials to grow the crop and follow 
strict rules about the use of the technology (Monsanto 2015). These legal provi-
sions essentially compel farmers to purchase whole new farming systems that are 
controlled by the patent holder (private actor) instead of the farmer. Once farmers 
adopt a new growing system it is then difficult to revert back to older, presum-
ably less productive, agricultural systems, hence pushing them further along the 
technical treadmill and reinforcing path dependency. Goe and Kenney (1988) pro-
vide a succinct description of this process of resource capture: “This privatization 
process is transforming agricultural information into a purchased farm input”. 
Although their description relates to the capture of ‘agricultural information’ it 
can be logically extended to describe the process of private entities capturing 
genetic information, in this case knowledge commons, or any public goods for 
private gain.
Some protected plant varieties have infiltrated the Indian agriculture sector, 
particularly cotton, bringing economic benefits in the short-term to a farmer but 
sometimes with negative consequences for farmers in the long-term, they become 
trapped in path dependencies on certain sellers and products. Genetically modified 
cotton – containing genetic material from the bacterium Bacillus  thuringiensis 
that express proteins toxic to lepidoptera (moths and butterflies) – commonly 
known as Bt cotton was introduced to India in 2002. Bt cotton was developed by 
Monsanto Corporation to reduce crop damage by the bollworm complex, a group 
of moths whose larval forms bore into cotton flowers causing devastating crop 
losses. The environmental and economic costs of reducing bollworm impacts are 
very high. In 2001 India used more than 21,000 tons of pesticides to reduce boll-
worm damage to cotton, approximately half the total amount of pesticides used 
across all agriculture in India (Karihaloo and Kumar 2009). Early studies of agro-
nomic and economic impacts were very favorable, as profits increased through 
a combination of reduced applications of pesticides and fertilizer with higher 
yields. Bt cotton adoption has also decreased the rate of poisoning events from 
pesticides (Kouser and Qaim 2011). The seeds cost more than three times that of 
‘local’ varieties and require more labor, but farmers’ profits increased by as much 
as 50% (Fischer et al. 2015b). During 2009, a mere seven years after the introduc-
tion of the first generation of Bt cotton Bollgard I (Monsanto 2015), Monsanto 
confirmed that pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiella) resistance was found 
in cotton crops across four states of western India. This necessitated the adoption 
of Bollgard II, the next generation of cotton that expressed two proteins (Cry1Ac 
and Cry2Ab2) from Bacillus thuringiensis, which are toxic to bollworms. In the 
United States of America, bollworm resistance to Bolgard II was already appar-
ent (Ali and Luttrell 2007). In India, however, the technology was adopted with 
success until resistance was detected as early as 2010 (Tabashnik and Carrire 
2010) creating subsequent problems. Farmers in major cotton growing districts 
are reporting high levels of damage to their crops by pink bollworm. This example 
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demonstrates the negative consequences of path dependency induced by priva-
tized seed providers. Farmers, once locked-in to these systems of production 
become reliant on privatized inputs and the continual development of new variet-
ies by private actors holding they are dependent on. Farmers in these small-holder 
systems once relied on local adapted agricultural varieties, or varieties that were 
developed by their governments and NGOs usually at much lower cost and input 
requirements (Pearse 1980; Shiva 1991). In turn farmers who choose not to, or 
cannot, adopt these new farming systems often find themselves marginalized and 
their traditional forms of livelihoods threatened (Pearse 1980).
The agricultural sector is expanding the scope of what types of public goods 
can now be privatized and legally protected. National and international legal 
frameworks now provide that right to privately own genetic resources, often 
undermining traditional farming institutions based on seed sharing and saving. 
In addition seed patents may increase the homogenization of agriculture plant 
varieties made available and sold to farmers by private actors (Hoisington et al. 
1999). Homogenization or mono-cropping may bring efficiency gains, but at 
the cost of increasing pest resistance, decreasing farmland biodiversity (Hooper 
et al. 2012) and decreasing nutritional diversity of the food produced (Frison 
et al. 2011). While many gains have been stated from technologies advancing 
enhanced seed varieties, these gains often incur substantial social costs (e.g. finan-
cial risk for farmers; loss of biodiversity) requiring broader evaluative criteria to 
assess their sustainability. The procedural justice challenges exist in the access to 
seed resources regarding who can decide what gets privatized and how it can be 
accessed. Farmers who participate in privatized agricultural systems can become 
path dependent on continually buying seeds and equipment from companies who 
now control access to the next year’s harvest and the necessary technologies for 
pest control.
3. Discussion
3.1. Privatization now exists in new, diverse and hybrid forms
We have highlighted three forms of privatization, using three diverse case stud-
ies as examples of how each form of privatization is manifesting in a diverse 
and largely unexamined way within social-ecological systems. The three forms 
include: (1) privatization of a physical resource (property rights in rangelands), 
(2) the privatization of governance processes (eco-certification in fisheries), and 
(3) privatization of intellectual property (seeds patents). Below we discuss the 
broad context of emergence for new forms of privatization and how each mani-
fests in our cases.
The institutional legacy of economic privatization policies is premised on the 
assumption that such policies provide effective and efficient solutions to the often 
costly, but not impossible to solve, rivalry and excludability challenges faced 
in the management of open access common-pool resources, e.g. (Hardin 1968). 
These policies have carved out the institutional landscape of natural resource 
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 management in the Western world for the last half-century (Villalonga 2000; 
Carothers and Chambers 2012). However, the rationale for using a privatized 
approach to governance is now manifesting into new, often hybridized and diffi-
cult to recognize approaches. What is actually being privatized, the drivers behind 
emerging institutions and the mechanisms for how privatization is implemented, 
suggests a need to re-conceptualize the newly emerging institutional landscape 
of commons governance and examine whether the legacy of traditional privatiza-
tion policies is suitable for sustainably governing globalized commons challenges 
within what we now understand as multidimensional SES. Thus, there is an evi-
dent need to rethink and broaden the definition of what can be, and what currently 
is, being privatized. Also, how the singular good being privatized (e.g. space, 
individual resources, governance, intellectual property) is really introducing mul-
tidimensional interactions and outcomes within SES that are often unforeseen, 
unpredictable and undesirable.
Simultaneously, reflection on the different property regimes existing, manag-
ing CPRs or public goods, may require re-conceptualizing what ‘commons’ in the 
21st century are. In addition, the types of governance challenges they may face, 
and if privatization is a desirable solution given the multidimensional interactions 
that occur within SES that the actual privatized goods are nested within. Many 
commons are now global in their scope regarding who can access them, broad-
ening the scale at which rivalry and excludability become difficult to solve, and 
externalities more difficult to internalize or account for in a complex system. In 
addition, numerous commons are non-physical, such as information and market 
access (power structures). Excludability challenges are now about who knows 
what, or who has specific information, rather than simply who can access a physi-
cal resource at a specific place and time. Nonetheless, these new commons are 
being privatized, suggesting the need for broader criteria to evaluate privatization 
from a SES perspective and as a desirable governance approach for achieving 
societal goals related to sustainable resource management. 
Although the analysis and comparison between common property and private 
property has been examined for decades in the literature (Agrawal 2001), the 
binary categorization of policy approaches that fall on the spectrum between them 
can be revisited, because in many cases there are mixes of both. Because it allo-
cates exclusive use and management rights to a defined group, common property 
could be viewed as the first step towards enclosure, and is sometimes conceptual-
ized as “group private property.” Common property differs from private property 
primarily in its lack of transferability. Many diverse institutional arrangements 
exist, and common property scholars may benefit from a broader conceptualiza-
tion of the different types of common property, and how they are differentiated 
and interact with privatization in practice or through further conceptual under-
standings. In this paper, we argue that broader criteria are needed to evaluate 
the influence of privatization on SES outcomes, but that conceptualizing what 
is being privatized, and how, also needs expansion. This work would be closely 
linked to literature on common property.
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We can observe that property rights systems continue to be used around the 
world to manage CPRs. Rangeland systems in Mongolia exemplify this, where 
quasi-private long-term lease rights can create barriers to the access of campsites 
and some seasonal pastures to specific individuals or groups. However, priva-
tizing land access for camping and especially for grazing in an ecosystem with 
high spatial and temporal heterogeneity in rangeland productivity creates large 
inequities among herders. This ultimately centralizes gains to a few individuals 
who are more resilient to changes in social-ecological conditions. While distribut-
ing individual and group leases was a quick and efficient way to allocate camp-
sites to herders in a country transitioning from state control to a newly emerging 
democracy, quasi-privatization of pastures via a leasing system may not fit the 
ecological system dynamics, and risks reinforcing existing socioeconomic ineq-
uities and accelerating land degradation. In the Mongolian context, if leases are 
distributed to pasture user groups rather than individuals, and provisions exist to 
protect pastoralists’ right to transit (reducing degradation), allow flexibility and 
coordinated reciprocal use among groups (reducing spillover effects), and pro-
tect the rights of poor and marginalized herders (addressing distributive justice), 
this form of quasi-privatization could potential help to solve the current CPR 
dilemma. Although private property rights systems have existed as a mainstream 
approach to manage CPRs in fisheries, forestry and rangelands for decades, the 
evaluation criteria for analyzing the effects of privatization on system dynamics 
and the role private institutions play in influencing the achievement of normative 
sustainability goals receives less focus (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001; Wollenberg 
et al. 2007).
MSC is a new form of privatization which deals with a global commons and 
uses market-based mechanisms in an attempt to incentivize sustainable fisheries 
governance. The right to govern and be governed, can also be considered com-
mons. In theory, anyone can access the institutional space and influence it. In 
the classic notion of a democratic state, you have to be a citizen who can vote in 
democracies about what you want the state to do, but foreign private actors can 
also access the institutional space, and dictate what is being governed, how, and 
by who. Usually there are combinations of both, and the MSC example shows 
how private actors can govern through accessing the common institutional space. 
This occurs in fisheries by gaining increasing influence over how fisheries actors 
interface with resource use behavior incentives and how consumers drive such 
changes through markets. The reality of what influences governance through 
institutional development and change extends substantially into both private 
actors and markets, as evident in the fisheries sector.
Despite the fact that MSC has emerged to fill the governance void left by 
states who have in large part failed to mitigate rivalry, subtractability and the 
roving banditry of many industrial fishing fleets (Berkes et al. 2006), the market 
mechanisms driving potential success for MSC are the same that have under-
mined the ability of state interventions (i.e. the integration of fish into global 
markets (Eriksson et al. 2015)). The success of eco-certified products is beholden 
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to purchasing power, and relies largely on the imagery of sustainable branding 
and the goodwill of consumers to purchase products to effectively motivate gov-
ernance changes by making value-oriented sustainable choices. In this scenario, 
fisheries sustainability is then left to the goodwill of, mostly wealthy and Western/
Northern consumers. In addition, only compliant fisheries are eligible for the mar-
ket gains received from certification, and this is almost exclusively limited to a 
small subsection of the fisheries sector, excluding, often far more sustainable, 
small-scale fisheries. There is an evident mismatch in the distributional and proce-
dural justice of costs and benefits resulting from such market-driven governance 
approaches, where wealth directly equates to power in market-based governance. 
Large corporations, both distributors of seafood products and fishing companies, 
are wealthier.
The inputs to global agricultural systems are transitioning from traditionally 
held public goods, where seeds and farming technologies were once held as the 
common property of people and cultures around the world, into privatized goods. 
Seed patents, pest control and harvesting equipment now receive legal protec-
tions creating a private market for entire farming systems, often creating path 
dependencies on private technologies for farmers using them and questions of 
procedural justice relating to who has access and control over farming resources. 
A broader lens is needed to evaluate the sustainability of privatized agriculture 
systems as the legal protections for both corporations and farmers differs by coun-
try, and concerns are not only related to efficiency in access and production of 
resources, but justice and the functioning of agricultural systems in relation to 
farming livelihoods, biodiversity and public health.
3.2. Evaluating privatization from a social-ecological systems perspective
Taking a SES perspective can enhance how commons governance is evaluated 
and can meet normative societal goals in relation to sustainability. SES research 
has broadened the scope for evaluating human-environment relationships, and 
two aspects of an SES perspective can be highlighted in relation to evaluating 
privatization more comprehensively. (1) System interconnectivity (Liu et al. 
2007; Garmestani 2013; Barnes et al. 2017; Bodin 2017) and (2) the plurality 
of, and trade-offs between, different understandings of normative goals in SES 
(Miller et al. 2008; Audouin et al. 2013; Partelow and Winkler 2016). System 
interconnectivity realizes that changes to one part of a system may bring unfore-
seen or unpredictable changes across time and space to other parts of a linked 
system (i.e. spillovers and path dependencies). This creates challenges for gover-
nance approaches which are not adaptive to changes in a system or which do not 
consider broader scale interactions such as regional or institutional connectivity 
(Folke et al. 2005; Armitage et al. 2009).
Privatization polices that are able to adapt to social-ecological changes are 
more likely to manage commons challenges effectively. For example, quota sys-
tems in fisheries limit the number of permits and amount of fish that can be caught 
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each year based on fish population data, showing how privatization can address 
rivalry in fish harvesting through creating a market for quotas which can adapt to 
changes in ecosystem conditions (Costello et al. 2008). However, normative goals 
may also change in a system or present trade-offs for governance. Taking a SES 
perspective can help to identify which interacting system components affect goal 
achievement and which parts may create trade-offs or undermine goals. In the 
same fisheries example, quotas in fisheries may address rivalry in consumption 
with market trading scheme for catch shares, but establishing a catch share market 
creates economic competition among fishers for access to resources, which favors 
larger industrial fishers and corporations with more capital (Pinkerton and Davis 
2015). The goal of addressing rivalry in the commons may be misaligned with 
broader goals in the fisheries sector to increase equitable access and maintain 
livelihoods. We argue that analysis adopting a SES perspective can help to bet-
ter evaluate privatization, from an integrated systems perspective, as an effective 
governance approach.
3.3. Broadening the evaluative criteria of privatization 
Evaluating new forms of privatization with a SES perspective requires broad-
ening the evaluative criteria in relation to sustainability. Sustainability is not 
just finding governance approaches to solve rivalry and excludability dilemmas 
in the commons; these approaches must also do so in a way which achieves 
broader normative societal goals such as social justice and environmental sus-
tainability. Inclusion of such normative criteria has been featured in commons 
scholarship for decades. However, as privatization policies continue to have 
practical impacts on the reality of these criteria, and new forms of privatiza-
tion are emerging, it is important to revisit and reiterate these criteria as part 
of the normative basis trying to be achieved by such policies. Efficiency is 
not a sufficient normative goal itself, the aim should be to be efficient for a 
broader purpose such as for dimensions of justice or environmental sustain-
ability. Of course, who is to decide that dimensions of justice are the ‘right’ 
normative goals to have? If we are to take internationally agreed upon defini-
tions of sustainability seriously such as the Brundtland Commission’s (1987) 
emphasis on intra- and intergenerational equity, international human-rights 
advances (Pogge 2005) as well as secular moral frameworks such as human-
ism (Norman 2004), dimensions of justice play a central and generalizable 
role for broadly analyzing societal progress in different contexts. For example, 
even if MSC addresses excludability by creating governance institutions for 
fisheries management with a market for eco-certification, if the mechanisms 
through which MSC is implemented are not distributive and procedurally just, 
then the mechanisms for implementing a market-driven approach to fisheries 
governance may fail when broader evaluative criteria are applied. Similarly, 
if patent systems incentivize the innovation of agriculture systems but cre-
ate strong path dependencies, they can undermine the resilience of farming 
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 communities. Especially those who have established cultural practices and 
livelihood  dependence on the basis of access to what was always considered to 
be public goods, with minimal autonomy to change, may be most vulnerable. 
Ultimately, the sustainability of privatizing access to information needs further 
examination with broader evaluative criteria. 
4. Conclusion
Ultimately, common-pool resource governance approaches must consider how 
resource management policies address context specific system dynamics (Ostrom 
2007). We argue that CPR governance must also consider the broader societal 
goals that may be affected by that resource management. Broader evaluative cri-
teria for privatization policies would benefit the assessment of privatization as 
a useful tool in its continued implementation, and provide insight into how and 
when privatization approaches can best be applied as a governance approach for 
achieving societal sustainability goals.
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